The goal of this force, as initially reported, will include enforcement, not simply peacekeeping – two very different missions that each require an aggressive mandate, which allows for the use of lethal force and is intended to disarm Hamas and demilitarize the Gaza Strip.

I have thought about this issue for a long time, and offer the following

10 key components of any mandate discussed at the United Nations Security Council:

1. The ISF should have the authorization for use of deadly force, including the ability to kill Hamas and apply lethal force against those with guns who refuse to disarm or pose a threat to the civilian population.

2. The ISF should have the ability to protect the new governance apparatus that needs to emerge in Gaza, as well as the entire transitional process, including the technocratic committee and other bodies.

3. The ISF must be given the means and technology to destroy tunnels and engage in a systematic clearance process of this deadly threat and vulnerability to long-term security.

4. The ISF should be responsible for clearing unexploded munitions, which are estimated in the thousands of tons, and pose a significant risk to civilian safety, and are a source of rearmament for Hamas.

5. The ISF should be the beginning of a gradual process of trust-building that leads to the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, including from the buffer zone, and critically, should lead to the establishment of organic, capable, and professional Palestinian security forces that are from Gaza, not from the West Bank.

6. The ISF should utilize private military contractors and integrated service providers, when and where appropriate, to conduct specialized missions targeting Hamas and address logistical and other operational issues.

7. The ISF should coordinate closely with the Israeli military and be able to declare areas under their control 100% clear of Hamas to prevent these areas from being targeted by the Israeli military.

8. The ISF should facilitate the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid and distribution throughout Gaza to prevent theft and criminality by Hamas, gangs, and looters. Furthermore, it should coordinate closely with humanitarian organizations to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, facilities, supplies, and movements throughout the Gaza Strip.

9. The ISF should operate and protect Gaza’s border crossings with Israel and Egypt and ensure that no smuggling occurs above or below ground along Gaza’s borders with the two countries.

10. The ISF needs to coordinate with Israel to use and operate Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters for direct access, humanitarian missions, and to facilitate the entry of aid and supplies into the coastal enclave.

In addition to these tenets of the International Stabilization Force, there must be sustained and continued pressure on the creation of an international fund for Gaza to sponsor these activities.

It is my hope to see the world leaders come together, and for once, actually put forth something that will benefit the people of Gaza, and create a true pathway to a different reality for Gaza, Palestinians, Israelis, and the region.

The war in Gaza is far from over, even if it is tactically stopped for now. The agreement thus far is specific to Phase One, which relates to the hostage-prisoner swap and a partial Israeli military withdrawal from the Strip. Afterwards, new negotiations must start to address the arguably more difficult issues: Hamas’s disarmament, the entry of an international force into Gaza, a transitional governance apparatus, and the process of neutralizing threats emanating from the Strip. Hamas is expected to stall, delay, and create challenges for the enclave’s future without the terror group.

During this period, Hamas is likely to stall, drag things out, and seek to prevent a future for the coastal enclave without the terror group. Hopefully, there won’t be a resumption of hostilities after this phase is finished. Still, rational thinking, awareness, and pragmatism require an understanding of all the challenges ahead.

Hamas's agreement to give up its chief bargaining chip, the Israeli hostages, for Phase One of the deal was the result of unprecedented pressure against the terror group by Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt. Each of whom had their own interests: the Turkish want sanctions relief, the F-35 stealth fighter, new F-16s, and greater cooperation with the US; the Qataris got the apology from Israel for the failed airstrike and the US commitment to Doha’s national security through a new agreement/pact, and in exchange, in exchange for delivering the hostages, which meant delivering Hamas; and Egypt which has been terrified of the specter of forced displacement of Gazans into Sinai, and had mobilized the Egyptian army on the country’s eastern border could ease the intense tensions with Israel and threatened the peace treaty between the two countries, not to mention US foreign aid.

Cumulatively, this meant that the three countries (Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt) applied enormous pressure on Hamas, which is otherwise isolated, militarily weakened, its allies defeated, and without options.

As the hostage and prisoner exchange process unfolds, one thing to watch for is whether Hamas holds parades or “Super Bowl”-style parties during the handover of living and deceased Israeli hostages. Although the group had previously stated they wouldn’t do this, as they said earlier this year, they still did it anyway. If the terror group does this again, that should tell you everything you need to know about their future intent. A militant entity that’s supposedly willing to disarm wouldn’t engage in such depraved behavior to prove that it’s still around.

Let’s hope that Hamas terrorists are not scrambling to iron and dry-clean their folded/hidden military uniforms that they wouldn’t use during the war, because they are only used during their horrific displays of such despicable behavior as we saw in each exchange. These were, in fact, the only times Hamas fighters wore military uniforms in the past two years, while otherwise hiding among civilians in plain clothes during actual combat.

What comes next?

Over the next several days, more information, details, and specifics will be revealed about the plan, its implementation, and, hopefully, the framework for Phase Two discussions. It is imperative that during this time, the people of Gaza not be left behind with an emboldened Hamas, forgotten about following phase 1. The only way to effectively avoid this from happening is for the fulfillment of the entirety of the 20 Point Plan, including the complete disarmament of Hamas. De-Hamasifying Gaza will be the final factor in determining whether this plan can succeed in bringing truly stable peace to the region.

Many former hostages were present today at the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC for a commemoration hosted by the Hostages and Missing Families Forum with support from US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and his wife, Allison. Several former hostages shared the horror they went through on October 7 and beyond, not to mention the unimaginable suffering experienced by their families while waiting for their release. These voices are worth remembering whenever people try to convince you that October 7 and hostage-taking were somehow an inevitability due to occupation or oppression. What occurred on that fateful day was not “resistance” by any stretch of the imagination. It was nothing but violent criminality that was entirely unnecessary and avoidable. It did not need to happen.

The combination of an international stabilization force, a comprehensive deradicalization plan, economic rejuvenation, regeneration, Arab and international involvement, humanitarian support, capacity building, and the departure from rhetoric that proposed removing the population is a cumulatively positive framework and blueprint for managing Gaza’s future transformation.

The biggest challenge is two-fold: will Hamas accept a ceasefire that removes its chief leverage, the hostages, all at once in the first few days, and will the terror group agree to disarm or leave Gaza? So far, Hamas has stated that it has not formally seen the plan, nor has it been able to view an official proposal. Netanyahu’s apology to Qatar today, likely at Trump’s request, was probably a preparation for bringing Hamas back into the loop.

The second issue is whether Netanyahu and his government will keep their word or break the ceasefire once the hostages are retrieved. Some look at what he did in March when he decided not to pursue phase II of the truce that was initiated by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, as a warning that he might be willing to do the same thing, only this time, he won’t have the pressure of the hostage families and a large number of Israelis protesting against him.

Then there is the question of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which the Arabs want to be involved in Gaza as a way to create that pathway toward Palestinian Statehood, something that Trump’s plan also envisions. Yet, there is a gap between Trump’s plan and Netanyahu’s rhetoric on the near future, and how he still does not expect the PA to be part of the transitional period in the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Authority and a pathway to statehood will calm Egypt and Jordan down, invite Gulf participation, enable Saudi-Israeli normalization, and open numerous pathways for Israel’s regional integration and peace between Arab and Muslim countries on one hand, and the Jewish state on the other (expanding the Abraham Accords). Trump’s promise that the annexation of the West Bank would not be formalized as a matter of Israeli policy may have been an attempt to ensure that this outcome is achieved.

Still, if the Palestinian Authority is perpetually blocked from participating in Gaza’s future, it is difficult to imagine ways in which Arab and international demands can be truly fulfilled, and how Gaza could ever be part of a cohesive Palestinian national entity. One thing is clear: this plan may very well end up being like a whole host of others preceding it, just a pile of promises with nothing substantive happening after all the media coverage and hopes for a resolution. If, however, this succeeds in ending the war, Gaza will be proven to be the critical key to unlocking regional stability, the expansion of peace, economic prosperity, US geopolitical interests, and Israel’s integration.