All the while, despite the war in Iran having been portrayed as a “theater of resistance,” some Gazans are remarking that it is an ineffective theater for that purpose, and that Gaza is being used for a theatrical performance that, in the end, leaves them in even worse humanitarian conditions.

From external occupier to internal exploiter

Many Gazans are beginning to perceive that the pressures shaping daily life are emanating from internal sources rather than solely external ones. Civilian discussions have referenced a “domestic economic siege,” in which internal actors (Hamas and others) are controlling access to essential goods, inflating prices, and extracting value from a population already under extreme strain. This discourse conveys that residents in Gaza are feeling the impact of internal economic issues as acutely as impacts from external military pressures.

At the core of this shift is the formalization of what is sometimes called the tansiq (in Arabic, “coordination”) system, often described in ways that liken it to a cartel. Decisions by the Hamas-run Chamber of Commerce restrict the import of goods to a limited number of designated traders, effectively tightly controlling the flow of goods. The issues people discuss online are less about overall scarcity than about restricted access within a closely managed, controlled system. There may be goods in Gaza, but access to them is filtered through a narrow set of actors operating in coordination with the Hamas-led administration.

Public discourse increasingly points to monopolistic behavior in which major merchants hoard goods, release them selectively, and sell them at inflated prices through both formal and informal channels. External reports underscore the scale of the crisis, with food prices reportedly increasing as much as 84 percent week over week and surpassing 300 percent inflation compared to prewar prices, pushing Gaza closer to famine-like conditions. An important shift has taken place among locals: Previously, they saw these concerning trends as unavoidable outcomes of war; but now, they understand the trends as results from an intentional system.

With the inflated prices and the taxes charged, this system is effectively transferring wealth from the most vulnerable families—living in tents, displaced, and dependent—to those aligned with Hamas and Hamas-adjacent networks. The resulting zero-sum economy is fragmenting society, arguably dividing it into two classes: A tansiq class and a survival class. Such is development is destabilizing because it has reframed the crisis as one of internal, purposeful inequity rather than shared hardship. In some cases, the anger against these internal systems is as strong as the anger towards actual border closures by Egypt and Israel.

This perception has been reinforced by accusations that the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy is prioritizing institutional survival over public welfare, and that aid is being filtered, delayed, or diverted within the coordinated networks. This is a significant signal of mistrust in Hamas’s governance.

Informal and general discussion of the tansiq system is growing online. But among that discourse, there are allegations and claims that specific companies and entities, including Egypt-based ones operating in Gaza, are part of the tansiq systems. Reports indicate that fees imposed on traders have risen sharply, from a historical range of twenty thousand to fifty thousand dollars per truck to as much as $100,000 for general goods and up to $300,000 for medical supplies. These costs are passed on to consumers, meaning Gaza’s civilians. The result is a layered system of extraction in which each stage of movement and coordination adds to the final price of goods paid by Gazans in the market.

As trust in centralized systems erodes, Gazans are increasingly resorting to alternative mechanisms for survival, including by turning to digital finance, informal markets, and decentralized money networks. These mechanisms have expanded recently, enabling new pathways for access but also empowering a new class of unregulated actors that offer better access. With that being the case, establishing a new political authority from traditional pipelines is becoming less relevant, as it is not about who governs in name, but rather about who can deliver food, electricity, money, and security.

The ‘theater of resistance’

Overlying this shift is continued skepticism about the regional war. A prevailing narrative in Gaza increasingly frames the broader confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran as a performative display or a conflict that serves external interests while leaving Gaza’s humanitarian reality unchanged.

The war has not translated into meaningful improvements in access, mobility, or supplies. This perception reinforces a critical shift: Gazans are evaluating more on outcomes, not ideology. At the same time, the link between Gaza and the regional conflict does remain very real. The two are part of a single strategic system in which instability in one context inevitably reinforces instability in the other. De-escalation, therefore, must address both arenas simultaneously.

What this means for Gaza

The shift unfolding in Gazan discourse—in which more attention is placed on internal mechanisms of economic control—is bringing into question which groups hold legitimacy in the Strip and how they both earn and keep it. The emergence of monopolistic systems on one hand and decentralized networks of goods on the other (each fulfilling the wants and needs of different classes in Gaza) is fragmenting the foundations for future governance.

Thus, stabilizing Gaza will require more than additional aid from external sources or political negotiations. It will require building trust internally in how resources move, who controls them, how they are distributed, and whether the system is viewed as fair. Without that, Gaza is likely to move further down the pathway toward collapse.

Regional military escalation continues to dominate global headlines, yet conversations inside Gaza are increasingly centered on a different question: who is responsible for the collapse of daily life in the Strip?

The security situation continues to deteriorate under the combined pressures of ongoing Israeli military operations, humanitarian strain, and a weakening social order. In public discourse over the reporting period of March 9 to 13, ideological narratives of resistance appear to have given way to conversations grounded in the realities of survival—market instability, economic pressure, and diminishing trust in governing authorities.

For most Gazans, daily life remains precarious. Widespread displacement persists, and recent incidents—including the collapse of a structural wall onto civilian tents, resulting in mass casualties—have reinforced the fragility of already unsafe living conditions.

At the same time, global attention remains fixed on regional escalation. Missile strikes across the region are often framed in Western-based “pro-Palestine” movements and external groups as acts of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Inside Gaza, however, civilians increasingly view these developments as disconnected from the cause, and in some cases, they even argue that the regional war is exacerbating the difficulties Palestinians face. In that sense, a gap has appeared between geopolitical narratives being delivered on the global stage and the lived experience inside Gaza.

Economic grievances are outweighing political ones

Economic pressures are squarely at the center of Gaza’s internal discourse.

Residents increasingly use the term “khawa” (extortion) when talking about the informal levies imposed on goods and activities that are essential to daily life. These levies include fees on private electricity generators, charges on market stalls, and so-called “protection payments” tied to inflated prices. These costs vary by neighborhood and, while they are informal, they have become deeply entrenched in the economy.

This aligns with broader discussions about monopolistic market behavior. The coordination systems behind the entry and distribution of goods have concentrated access to essential goods to a limited number of actors.

As a result, consumers have had to pay inflated costs for goods and services. Electricity from private generators, now a necessity due to the collapse of the grid, can cost as much as twenty-seven Israeli new shekels (about nine dollars) per kilowatt-hour. Combined with food shortages, supply bottlenecks, and price inflation, these pressures have made economic survival the dominant concern for many Gazans.

Public conversations increasingly reflect a belief that the crisis is not solely the result of external restrictions but also internal economic practices. Skepticism is growing around how goods are priced, how aid is distributed, and where resources ultimately go. The unpredictability of supply and the opacity of distribution systems have intensified anxiety around food security and basic survival.

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The information ecosystem is shifting

A notable development is the rise of messages from those who identify as grassroots activists and citizen reporters. These kinds of messages garnered increasing influence within Gaza’s information ecosystem, based on the number of likes, reposts, and other engagements with this kind of content.

Operating largely through Telegram channels and informal digital networks, these individuals document economic exploitation, expose corruption, and circulate information that bypasses both official messaging and external narratives. These online discussions are beginning to function as parallel accountability systems. They track prices, name specific actors, document inconsistencies in aid distribution, and circulate real-time observations that are often more granular than formal reporting. This creates a bottom-up form of transparency that reshapes how legitimacy is assessed. Authority is no longer derived primarily from ideological positioning or political claims, but from whether actions can withstand continuous, decentralized scrutiny. In doing so, they are reshaping the internal conversation about governance, accountability, and Gaza’s future.

This decentralized flow of information is beginning to challenge both Hamas’s domestic messaging and the broader geopolitical framing of Gaza’s role in the regional conflict. It is also creating space for new forms of internal critique.

The growing visibility of local grievances, amplified by decentralized information networks, has created a space where criticism is increasingly expressed in collective and public terms. In this environment, the language used to describe suffering and assign blame is evolving, drawing on deeper cultural and moral frameworks to articulate a sense of injustice.

One of the most significant shifts is the changing use of religious language. Gazans are increasingly using traditional Islamic supplications—historically directed toward external adversaries—to express political frustration and, in some cases, to invoke divine judgment against Hamas leadership. This marks a meaningful transformation in the relationship between religious expression and political authority.

Over time, these kinds of grassroots networks may play a critical role in shaping internal political change by amplifying local grievances and redefining the terms of public discourse.

The risks associated with digital solutions are beginning to show

As Gaza’s physical infrastructure continues to degrade, many residents have turned to digital channels to manage daily survival.

Gazans are increasingly turning away from traditional networks of accessing aid and moving money, pivoting toward nontraditional networks—including Telegram groups, peer-to-peer wallets, and, increasingly, crypto-based transactions such as USDT (also known as Tether). They are doing so out of concern about the slowness and high costs affiliated with traditional formal channels. They’re also doing so as humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Programme, increasingly rely on digital wallets to distribute cash assistance in Gaza, with recent transfers reaching roughly 1,250 Israeli new shekels (about four hundred dollars) per household.

Digital wallets have become both a critical lifeline but also a source of uncertainty. The digital ecosystem is fragile. Much of Gaza operates on limited connectivity, often constrained to 2G networks, which significantly limits functionality. Moreover, these systems operate within a highly constrained infrastructure environment, marked by unreliable electricity, limited connectivity, and service disruptions. At the same time, reports of scams and fraud are on the rise. Fake wallet addresses, fraudulent charity appeals, and identity-based scams have left some families worse off after losing already scarce resources.

Local reporting and user-level accounts suggest that periods of high demand during aid disbursements can overwhelm these systems, temporarily limiting access to funds at the moment they are most needed. While these incidents are not formally documented in official reporting, they reflect broader concerns about the fragility of Gaza’s emerging digital financial infrastructure.

As a result, the digital financial system in Gaza reflects the same instability as the physical channels it was meant to supplement.

What happens next in Gaza will come from inside—not outside—the Strip

Taken together, these trends point to a fundamental shift in Gaza’s internal dynamics.

Economic hardship, market instability, and perceived internal exploitation are increasingly central to public discourse, rivaling—and in some cases surpassing—traditional political grievances. At the same time, the rise of decentralized information networks and the transformation of religious rhetoric suggest a deeper erosion of authority that extends beyond material conditions into the moral foundations of governance.

If current trends persist, the most consequential changes in Gaza will likely emerge not from regional military developments but from within. The convergence of economic pressure, fragmented information flows, and declining trust in centralized authority creates the conditions for an unstable political landscape.

In this environment, legitimacy will come not from ideology or external alignment, but from the successful provision of the basic conditions for life.

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Since the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, the expanding regional war has reverberated inside the Gaza Strip. The war hasn’t brought direct military confrontation into Gaza, but it has impacted political rhetoric, humanitarian pressure, and public sentiment.

Polarizing sentiment on Hamas

The war has had an interesting impact on the rhetoric around Hamas. Given how Hamas has framed the war as part of a broader confrontation with Israel and the United States, the war appears to have strengthened support for Hamas in some segments of the population. Yet, civilian discussions also show a significant surge in dissent, rising 71 percent week over week in the reporting data. The polarization reflects a population increasingly divided between those still rallying behind “resistance narratives” and those openly blaming Hamas for Gaza’s devastation and its inability to govern daily life.

A similar divide is appearing in the public’s sentiment about the ongoing alignment between Hamas and the Iranian regime, a topic that did not feature prominently in previous weeks. Some Gazans criticize Hamas and its alliance with Iran for having helped produce Gaza’s collapse, while others continue supporting Hamas narratives of “steadfastness” and “armed resistance.”

The splintering of public opinion takes place amid a wider backdrop of a breakdown in governance, in which local clans and informal networks are increasingly attempting to usurp control over territory and resources that are typically managed by a centralized authority.

Yet, hunger and danger remain major concerns

While the war has influenced narratives both supporting and criticizing Hamas, the central questions for Gazans are far more practical: who can actually move food, control prices, secure neighborhoods, and deliver minimally credible governance. At present, no actor, including Hamas, has full control to perform these functions.

With the war unfolding, Gaza’s already fragile environment has become even more volatile. Border crossings have tightened, aid flows have fluctuated, and economic activity has become even more constrained as the war affects the movement of goods and humanitarian supplies. Moreover, Gazans fear that their circumstances have become a secondary geopolitical concern amid the wider conflict with Iran, despite the more than two million Palestinians still trapped in an extreme and constantly evolving humanitarian crisis.

Civilians have described their daily conditions as worsening, with food access, aid distribution, and local market prices becoming increasingly unstable. Numerous reports since the US and Israeli strikes on Iran suggest that merchants are hoarding certain goods and sharply raising prices on essential food and household items. Discussions surrounding the suspension of the World Central Kitchen’s operations featured prominently during the reporting period, reinforcing fears that humanitarian assistance is becoming more erratic, less reliable, and increasingly insufficient.

A warning sign for civil unrest

The coming weeks will depend heavily on how long the war persists and how deeply it continues to destabilize conditions inside Gaza. Policymakers—including those involved in the Board of Peace and the technocratic committee—should closely monitor how the wider conflict is affecting aid access, border operations, and internal stability in the Strip.

Finally, observers should watch for warning signs of broader civil unrest. As hunger deepens and economic collapse accelerates, it remains possible that public anger could once again spill into open protest, as has occurred at various moments. It remains to be seen whether the recent rise in negative sentiments toward Hamas will translate into sustained collective action, and whether Hamas will continue to be a source of frustration within a fragmented society. Sentiments around Hamas and the potential impacts of these sentiments will be an important indicator to monitor in the coming weeks.

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This week in Washington, the newly formed Board of Peace met to confirm pledges of donations and troops toward stabilizing Gaza. Meanwhile, the reality on the ground remains volatile and characterized by sustained military activities, internal friction, economic failures, and black markets. Civilian discussions we have analyzed this week center on deep insecurity, market instability, and the lack of clarity regarding governance and representation.

Enforcement from a distance

There were over a dozen reported incidents of strikes, artillery shelling, or drone fire found in online discourse among Gazans this week. Eastern Gaza City was one of several reported focal points of civilian fatalities, with artillery shelling and drone strikes impacting dense residential areas.

Civilian reports provided a multitude of examples in which the eastern perimeters, especially near Nuseirat and Khan Younis, were seen as being enforced through drones and precision fire from a distance, without an active troop presence. Additionally, reports of sniper fire near entrances to some villages or agricultural areas and peripheries in the eastern zones of Gaza add to these interpretations.

In many of these cases, casualty figures increased over days, suggesting delayed rescue efforts. Following these incidents, local hospitals, including Al-Shifa, reported overcrowding and limited capacity. For example, after a report of an airstrike on the Al-Dawli building, casualty reports climbed over several hours, reinforcing concerns reported on social media about restricted access to injured civilians and delays in recovering bodies.

In Al-Zaytoun, there were repeated reports of sniper fire that led to civilian deaths and injuries, including women and children. Similar patterns were observed in central and southern Gaza. Public sentiment was particularly focused on strikes in displacement zones, including tents housing displaced residents. Gazans discussed recurrent strikes in densely populated zones with increasing anger, frustration, and fear.

A notable incident this week was a reported airstrike targeting the Sheikh Radwan Police Station, resulting in sixteen reported fatalities and fifteen wounded, including police officers and detainees. Online commentary frequently noted the symbolic nature of this airstrike, framing it as an attack on a civilian-focused security facility and emphasizing that detainees in custody were “unfairly doomed” to death. Additionally, a paramedic was reported to be killed on the job, reinforcing the perception that no profession or civilian role guarantees safety.

Street clashes and internal fragmentation

This week’s analysis featured increasing civilian discussions around clashes in Al-Zaytoun and eastern Rafah. Reports indicated confrontations between established Hamas units and reemerging local militias. This is a notable development, as there have been limited overt challenges to Hamas’s monopoly on violence since the cease-fire. If sustained, this would be a significant problem for the cease-fire’s durability, as the “truce” negotiated by Hamas’s political echelons may lose effectiveness amid ground-level clashes.

A new pattern emerged this week, where discourse featured terms like “systemic brutality” and “war crimes” in reference to internal power struggles in the Strip and between Palestinians, rather than to describe the external conflict with Israel. However, Hamas-oriented channels provided descriptions of Hamas’s “deterrence force” actively confronting “criminal gangs” and those that Hamas alleges are opposition “agents” (meaning supported by Israel). This demonstrates that Hamas is intent on asserting internal control and will continue to suppress any actor perceived as oppositional.

Price volatility

Many of the market concerns remain the same week over week: constrained liquidity, limited market access in the north, and little visible aid in northern zones, as well as insufficient aid reported in central and southern zones relative to actual demand. Prices of basic goods continue to vary widely across the Strip. For example, a tray of eggs can be reported to cost as little as 3 Israeli new shekels (NIS), or about one dollar, in some zones and 38 NIS in others, while items like chicken are only referenced in messages from central Gaza, with a range of 5 NIS to 40 NIS. Even tents have price variation, with this week’s analysis of over one thousand messages showing prices ranging anywhere from 40 NIS to 3,000 NIS in the Rafah and Khan Younis areas.

Aid distribution remains one of the most consistent sources of internal friction. Complaints center on unfair allocation, favoritism, opaque selection criteria, and exclusion from distributions. In some cases, these failings are attributed to political influence and nepotism.

International actors

International actors and Hamas collectively account for nearly 18 percent of all discussion channels reviewed. This week, many of the discussions on international actors focused on Israel, with the sentiments displayed including outrage, exhaustion, and resentment.

Sentiments toward the United States appear to remain skeptical and critical, but not entirely hostile; there is a sense of frustration more than fury. Other actors are mostly described by their incompetence, such as the United Nations, Egypt, and Qatar, but are not perceived with the same negativity as the United States or Israel. Meanwhile, discussions about the Palestinian Authority remain minimal, a symbol of its limited relevance to the lived experiences of Gazans.

Hamas messaging campaigns and narrative trends

Pro-regime Hamas channels amplified coordinated messaging efforts this week. One focal point was the status of prisoners, particularly the reported beating of a Hamas official in Israeli custody. Pro-Hamas accounts framed the incident as evidence of intentional abuse, starvation, medical neglect, and systemic targeting of prisoners. The incident was repeatedly described as a “war crime,” reinforcing broader accusations against Israeli authorities.

Simultaneously, Hamas leadership circulated high-level statements rejecting disarmament. This coordinated messaging discredited claims from the United States and others regarding potential disarmament agreements. Within this discourse, disarmament is equated with permanent subjugation. For example, Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas’s diaspora office, framed disarmament as rendering Palestinians defenseless and vulnerable to elimination. By linking prison-abuse imagery with arguments against disarmament, Hamas-supporting channels create a narrative that positions arms as the sole deterrent against unchecked Israeli violence.

What to watch

Civilian discourse this past week reflects sustained insecurity, growing frustration over aid and market instability, and increasing concern over internal fragmentation. Questions regarding who speaks for Gaza, and who meaningfully represents or serves civilian interests, remain prominent. Simultaneously, fears of deteriorating street-level security and fragmentation of hard power monopolies continue to surface.

Without stabilization of both security and governance, public trust and cohesion in Gaza will be further eroded in the coming weeks due to the convergence of external military pressure, internal factional strain, and economic volatility.

At this weekend’s Munich Security Conference, Nickolay Mladenov, who serves as high representative for Gaza on the US-led Board of Peace, cast an important spotlight on the fragility of the cease-fire in Gaza, warning that significant violations are jeopardizing the agreement’s sustainability, as well as progress on post-war governance and reconstruction. That assessment aligns with what civilians in Gaza fear. Throughout messages we observed this week, uncertainty about the cease-fire’s durability and the viability of the second phase overall was rampant.

One part of the cease-fire agreement drew particular attention this week: disarmament.

Across messages observed in Gaza’s online discourse, civilians frame disarmament as a highly sensitive issue. But the concerns over disarmament appear to be rooted in fear rather than in ideology. Commentary online casts weapons as instruments of deterrence under asymmetric conditions.

In addition, many of the messages about disarmament portray it as a precondition imposed from outside, or a concession made without enforceable guarantees, and they warn about the effects disarmament could have on Palestinian vulnerability and future sovereignty. Across the board, skepticism remains high regarding whether external actors would honor commitments in exchange for a concession such as disarmament.

The strikes keep coming

Gazan civilian discourse logged at least twenty-two military strikes across the Strip during the reporting period.

From what Gazans have posted online, it is clear that danger and constrained mobility continue to restrict daily life. Uncertainty about the cease-fire’s durability and the shifting boundaries of risk shape civilians’ decisions about their movements. Residents rely heavily on informal warning networks and word-of-mouth communications to determine safe routes. The Yellow Line functions as a fluid zone, often enforced through surveillance mechanisms remotely. Even within displacement zones, families delay relocation decisions until it becomes clearer whether the cease-fire’s second phase will proceed.

Northern Gaza, particularly Al-Tuffah, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Nasr, and Jabalia, continues to experience shelling, drone activity, and sniper fire, affecting residential areas rather than a defined battle zone. Civilians talk of fatalities in homes, on streets, and at social gatherings and interpret these instances as violations of civilian sanctity and protection norms. Central Gazans report drone and aircraft strikes, while southern Gazans report strikes near displacement areas. Across regions, the second phase of the twenty-point Gaza peace plan introduced by US President Donald Trump remains uncertain and is viewed with apprehension.

Prices are soaring

Prices for flour, gas, and other basic goods remain elevated with regional variation across the Strip. Reports indicate that a kilogram of flour costs 130 Israeli new shekels (about forty-two dollars) this week. Cigarettes, considered a luxury item, reportedly cost up to five hundred dollars per pack. Scarcity persists, and predictability remains limited. Fuel shortages, driven by both availability constraints and high costs, limit and disrupt bakeries, medical facilities, and other critical services. Residents in central and southern areas of the Strip note that local markets offer limited fresh produce, dairy, and meat, while civilians posting from northern Gaza say that markets there largely lack these goods entirely.

Civilians report that aid continues to fail to reach northern areas in any meaningful quantity. In central and southern Gaza, aid remains visible, but consistently insufficient relative to the need. Long queues, repeated registration attempts without delivery, and confusion regarding responsibility for distribution contribute to frustration and perceptions of inequitable access. Residents blame corruption, but those are primarily moral accusations based on feelings of betrayal and inequality, rather than explicit allegations or documented claims.

Skepticism and disappointment

Civilians have been persistently skeptical about international actors. Their messages have included references to the United States, the United Nations, and the Palestinian Authority. Civilians frequently say the United States is capable of applying pressure but unwilling or unable to translate that pressure into tangible improvements in humanitarian conditions.

Regarding other international actors, civilians frame Qatar primarily as a facilitator rather than a controlling actor. Iran appears in the discourse primarily within a regional context, but the online discourse largely does not portray Iran as an actor directly shaping daily conditions in Gaza. In contrast, Israel is consistently portrayed as an immediate and direct actor shaping conditions and realities on the ground.

People in Gaza widely perceive externally generated political proposals, including governance councils and reconstruction frameworks, as top-down initiatives tied to broader geopolitical maneuvering rather than participatory processes. Many civilians express unease about decision making that is done without local participation. Even voices critical of existing leadership hesitate to endorse externally imposed structures. In reconstruction discussions, there is also concern that aid and rebuilding will become instruments of political restructuring and control, rather than neutral humanitarian outreach.

Hamas still in the conversation

Hamas remains present in civilian discourse but does not appear to be widely embraced. Pro-Hamas messages account for a small share of the overall discussion and are mostly pragmatic rather than symbolic or ideological. Civilians frequently describe Hamas as akin to a crisis manager in a difficult security environment, necessary for negotiation, continuity, and internal order. But participants in Gaza’s online discourse largely did not idealize the group.

Support for Hamas appears conditional and outcome-driven. If cease-fire conditions hold and aid flows improve, civilians appear to be more tolerant online. But during escalation or an intensification of shortages, skepticism and distancing become more common.

At the same time, explicit anti-Hamas messages remain limited. The relative absence of Hamas from discussions of daily survival may suggest that the population does not consider governance to have an effective role in shaping daily outcomes. Ongoing references to new internal security mechanisms call out Hamas’s consolidation of control. Civilians appear to judge Hamas by what it can provide rather than by ideology or a sense of collective aspiration.

A dark shadow as leaders meet

Across all types of discourse, discussion about survival continues to supersede political conversation. In Gaza, civilians assess stability by their access to bread, fuel, and physical safety, rather than by diplomatic language that remains largely intangible in daily life.

Beyond that, the conversation about disarmament is significant, as are interpretations that externally driven political processes reflect existing power imbalances rather than genuine global partnership. The latter casts a dark shadow as the Board of Peace holds its first meeting in Washington, DC, where participants are slated to contribute funds and chart the way forward for phase two in Gaza.

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Amid extreme and deteriorating humanitarian conditions across the Gaza Strip, civilians posted online with renewed urgency about the realities they face on the ground. This massive wave of posts eclipsed discussion devoted to political and strategic issues—but that doesn’t mean that such discussion ceased or even slowed at all.

In fact, the number of messages that reference Hamas increased this week in comparison to the previous one. Civilians mentioning Hamas over this period call attention to the group’s efforts to consolidate its structure, power, and influence. Discussions point to Hamas’s new, more brutal internal security apparatus designed to cool dissent and assert the group’s continued control over aid and other resources. Yet, online discourse also featured more pro-Hamas messages and more Hamas-neutral language, despite an overwhelming amount of discussion last week assigning blame to Hamas for civilian suffering. That raises the question of whether individuals are holding off from publicly assigning blame to Hamas for civilian suffering, out of fear of retribution.

During the reporting period, civilians mentioned twenty-two distinct airstrikes and continued to discuss the de facto military barrier in the Strip, known as the Yellow Line. This border remains a vague yet deadly boundary, restricting civilians’ access and mobility across the Strip. Security-related reports remain a consistent proportion of the overall discussion, week over week, indicating that the impacts of military activity on civilians have shifted little.

As the inaugural meeting of US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace approaches, conversations in Gaza present a bleak outlook, showcasing a deep sense of suffering, fatalism, and a dangerous resignation to the fact that Hamas’s power is here to stay.

Dangerous conditions from shooting, winter weather, and other hazards

Throughout the week, civilians from the north of the Strip recount repeat airstrikes, artillery shelling, and drone and sniper fire. During these instances, residents report, many fatalities occurred inside homes, on main streets, or other locations central to daily life. The situation in northern Gaza remains an urgent humanitarian challenge and a lethal environment. In central Gaza, civilians tell of ambulances unable to reach victims due to strikes, ongoing shelling, or a lack of fuel. Similarly, residents in southern areas of the Strip report airstrikes, artillery fire, drone fire, and even reports of naval shelling hitting residential areas and displacement camps.

On top of these dangers, the ongoing winter conditions—including temperatures as low as 50 degrees Fahrenheit, rain, and exposure to the elements—continue to compound the destruction and disaster civilians experience. Residents in central Gaza report that rainfall results in persistent mud, stagnant water, and sewage overflows, exacerbating unsanitary and hazardous conditions in these areas. In the north, civilians remain trapped by these conditions, unable to move southward, at times being displaced to different regions of the north.

Eastern lands are lost forever

Local residents allege that an increasing number of zones in eastern Gaza are now military or “no-go” zones. In the northern and eastern zones of Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Al-Tuffah, Al-Zaytoun, and Shuja’iyya, civilians report that agricultural and residential areas are inaccessible, flattened, bulldozed, and cleared. Those posting on social media describe these areas as permanently lost.

In central Gaza, residents of Al-Burejj, Nuseirat, and Deir al-Balah report that movement near the eastern areas is risky, with a high potential for being fired upon. While the concept of the Yellow Line is widely understood, its precise location remains unclear; civilians navigate these areas based on rumors and word-of-mouth. Meanwhile in southern Gaza, residents say that the large areas east of the displacement zones near Khan Younis and Rafah are “militarily sealed,” explaining they are in practice off-limits despite the absence of formal declarations. Throughout the Strip, movement near eastern zones is unpredictable and dangerous. This aligns with recent Israeli military statements. For example, a battalion commander in an Alexandroni Reserve Infantry Brigade told The Times of Israel this week, after recent incidents where Hamas operatives crossed the Yellow Line to attack Israeli troops, that “No one is allowed to cross the Yellow Line. Whoever crosses is destroyed or eliminated at that moment.”

Humanitarian access remains severely constrained. In northern Gaza, residents say that aid is scarce to nonexistent, with few reports of arrivals or aid distributions during the past week and virtually no access to fresh food, bottled water, or cooking gas. Aid is almost entirely delivered via southern Gaza (Rafah), with civilians arguing that aid does not reach northern populations. While in central Gaza, aid is visible, it remains insufficient and irregular, and points of aid delivery quickly become overcrowded, especially during water distribution. Even in southern displacement zones, residents describe aid as inadequate and unevenly distributed.

Opportunity and agency are limited

The Palestinian Monetary Authority reported that by the end of 2025, unemployment in Gaza exceeded 77 percent, with remaining employed individuals largely public-sector employees (often unpaid or receiving delayed pay) or humanitarian workers. From the conversations on social media, it appears that the lack of formal employment has led to a temporary labor market characterized by jobs unloading trucks, delivering supplies, cleaning shelters, installing tents, carrying water, and transporting goods by cart. According to discussions, opportunities are short-term, poorly paid, and physically demanding. Gazans report extreme price volatility, and the lack of cash assistance means that families in the camp areas must rely on aid or community support. Throughout the discourse, people say their poverty further erodes their social roles, self-worth, agency, and dignity.

Anti-Hamas perspectives may see their window of opportunity close

Pro-Hamas messages accounted for approximately 2.6 percent of the dataset, while explicitly anti-Hamas messages came in low at .024 percent, consistent with weeks prior. That raises fears that Gazans could be reducing, softening, and quieting their anti-Hamas statements, meaning that a window of opportunity to voice and spotlight these perspectives may be closing. Additionally, the overall low amount of discussion about Hamas indicates that the group’s role in shaping broader sentiments is limited, if not negligible.

Hamas-affiliated channels continue to deflect responsibility toward external actors. It is unlikely a coincidence that the establishment of new security and intelligence units has coincided with less visibility of dissent and a stronger pro-Hamas sentiment. Taken together, this could limit the possibilities for the emergence of organized civilian opposition to Hamas and could reinforce a climate of fear and political paralysis.

This week’s discourse from Gaza reflects the entrenchment of continued deprivation, territorial losses, and constrained expression. As diplomatic initiatives advance outside of Gaza, civilian conversations reveal a population increasingly frustrated, resigned to the permanence of struggle and to shrinking agency. The decline in overt political discourse does not automatically signal acceptance of or legitimacy for Hamas. More likely, it reflects fear of surveillance and the increasingly intense pressure for survival. Unfortunately, the likely outcome of limited political discourse and fear instilled by Hamas is that the chances for any political renewal inside Gaza risk evaporating, with consequences that extend well beyond this cease-fire moment.

Bear witness to the lived realities of Gazans and help inform a credible path forward by checking in with The Gaza Situation Report each week.

Since the cease-fire began, civilian discourse from Gaza signals a population living in paralysis amid constant danger, deprivation, and uncertainty. Across districts, residents describe a high-risk security environment, limited meaningful safety on the ground, worsening humanitarian conditions, and deepening distrust toward nearly every actor involved.

In northern Gaza, civilians describe near-total immobility. Roads are damaged, blocked, or too dangerous to use. Winter storms have destroyed already fragile shelters, while aid, water, and medical access are described as nearly nonexistent. The prevailing sentiment is abandonment. Residents speak of being cut off from the rest of the Strip, with no viable options for survival or movement.

Elsewhere in Gaza, movement remains severely constrained. Daily life is organized around avoiding risk, with civilians relying on informal alerts and word-of-mouth to navigate danger. Fatalism dominates the discourse, alongside repeated references to the seeming permanence of current conditions. As Gazans watch political processes unfold, virtually all actors, including Israel, international institutions, and Palestinian political factions, are perceived to be advancing agendas disconnected from civilian reality. Even institutions with relatively positive reputations, such as the United Nations, are described as present but largely ineffective in shaping daily life.

Loss of faith in safe zones

Civilian conversations portray an environment where death and injury are frequent and unpredictable amid conflict. Reports of artillery shelling and airstrikes across Gaza City and northern Gaza often place impacts near residential areas, with casualties framed not as the outcome of larger-scale Israeli military operations in which victims are often collateral damage but rather as the result of intentional fire in densely populated zones.

In central Gaza, discourse portrays drone activity and repeated shelling that produce fatalities across multiple incidents rather than single mass-casualty events. Civilians frequently worry about a possible slow progression from injury to death due to the lack of medical supplies, fuel, and functioning hospitals. In southern Gaza, including Khan Younis and Rafah, residents report airstrikes, naval shelling, and ground fire, reinforcing the belief that there are no genuinely safe zones or safe hours in the Strip.

Residents often relocate to survive. Civilians discuss managing the influx of families moving south from the north, alongside repeated internal relocations driven by strikes, weather, or evacuation warnings. Residents say that even designated displacement areas are unsafe and inadequate in offer ingprotection or stability.

Worries about winter weather, shelter failure, and preventable death

Severe winter weather has become a lethal force. Extreme winds and heavy rain have flooded infrastructure, worsened illness, and repeatedly destroyed tents and makeshift shelters. In southern displacement zones, residents report lacking the materials, fuel, or infrastructure needed to protect themselves from the cold; over the reporting week, temperatures dropped to as low as 42 degrees Fahrenheit at night, and at least three days of rain were recorded.

Reports of children, infants, and elderly people dying from hypothermia inside tents appear with increasing frequency. Civilians regard these deaths as preventable yet ignored, as casualties of neglect rather than combat. Gazans in southern areas say that displacement zones offer no refuge from violence or deadly living conditions.

A flood of “lost and found” posts

One of the clearest indicators of social breakdown is the volume of “lost and found” posts circulating across Gaza. These announcements—often outnumbering other types of content—include reports of children separated from parents, elderly relatives left behind, family members lost during military incidents, and essential items that have gone missing such as IDs, phones, and medical documents.

Many of these messages originate from displacement zones, highlighting the absence of centralized systems to track or reunite civilians. What might appear as mundane postings instead reflect deep administrative collapse and widespread social fragmentation.

Confusion about the Yellow Line

Discussion about the Yellow Line underscores a pervasive sense of fear and confusion. In Jabalia and eastern Gaza City, civilians point to bulldozing, trench digging, and home demolitions that have created protected corridors enforced by live fire and constant surveillance. Residents argue that movement across these areas is impossible.

Elsewhere in Gaza City, the Yellow Line is said to cut deeper into dense urban neighborhoods as control expands street by street, resulting in widespread housing loss and civilian exclusion. In central Gaza, many residents discuss their fear the line is moving westward without warning, creating uncertainty about future access and displacement. Civilians in southern Gaza, including Khan Younis and Rafah, describe the line as invisible but lethal, an undefined boundary where accidental crossing can trigger immediate fire.

Difficulties to secure aid and water

Aid access remains extremely limited in northern Gaza, where civilians report only small distributions of flour and canned goods. Fresh food, bottled water, cooking gas, and adequate medical aid are largely absent. Families shelter in damaged homes or improvised coverings.

In central Gaza, aid is more visible but widely described as insufficient relative to the population’s needs. Sanitation and hygiene supplies are notably scarce. While new tents are often directed toward Rafah and Khan Younis, these same areas face chronic water shortages. Across regions, civilians accuse aid systems of favoritism, diversion, or symbolic distribution.

Markets may exist, but goods are frequently unaffordable, driving the rise of cash-only survival economies. Civilians report selling aid items to buy water, fuel, or medicine, an experience described as deeply humiliating and corrosive to dignity.

Fragmentation of Hamas’s legitimacy

Discourse related to Hamas shows visible erosion and a fragmentation of Hamas’s legitimacy. A dominant strand frames Hamas as a failed and oppressive governing authority, accused of corruption, mismanagement, and prioritizing organizational survival over civilian welfare. Gazans directly link deteriorating living conditions to governance choices rather than framing them as unavoidable outcomes of war.

The October 7 attack remains a moral focal point in these discussions, with anger directed at those perceived to have initiated a war without the capacity to protect civilians. Alongside governance critiques are reports and allegations of coercion by Hamas-affiliated security forces, including raids, arrests, and intimidation of displaced families. These incidents generate fear, humiliation, and clan-level backlash, reframing Hamas as a threat rather than as a source of protection. Religious and ideological critiques further deepen polarization and distrust.

Mixed sentiment about external actors

Political developments also surfaced prominently this week. The recovery of the remains of Ran Gvili, the last Israeli hostage in Gaza, prompted sharp juxtaposition in civilian discourse. Many Gazans argue that the recovery of the last hostage showed whose lives and remains are treated as recoverable and whose remain unresolved beneath rubble. The moment was widely perceived as tilting the balance of leverage in Israel’s favor within ongoing political processes.

Many civilians view Egypt ambivalently as Gaza’s only point of exit (through Rafah) but simultaneously regard it as a suffocating gatekeeper. Gazans also say the United Nations is present but ineffective, and label the United States as the ultimate decision-maker and enabler.

This discourse matters

This week’s civilian discourse makes clear that Gaza’s crisis is no longer defined solely by active hostilities. Normalized deprivation, fear, and abandonment increasingly shape this crisis. When movement is dangerous, aid is unreliable, shelter is lethal, and authority is contested, survival itself is experienced almost as a punishment.

These perceptions matter. They shape trust, compliance, legitimacy, and the prospects for any cease-fire, governance transition, or recovery framework. By ignoring this civilian discourse, one risks overlooking the conditions that determine whether any political or humanitarian intervention can hold.

When asked about Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Gaza’s reconstruction, Trump publicly affirmed that Riyadh will play a major role, an assertion that MBS did not contradict or waiver on. Trump reassured that “there is no amount being claimed. It will be a lot. But we will definitely help. . . Yeah, he’s going to—it’s very important to [MBS].” This is a significant on-the-record diplomatic signal.

MBS also reiterated that Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords remains contingent on a credible pathway to a two-state solution. His remarks underscored that this demand was not merely a symbolic or performative act, but rather a principled prerequisite for engagement. This comes at a critical time, when the two-state solution has largely fallen out of political favor with many.

Taken together, these statements created a real opening to channel broad political intentions into concrete commitments to funding Gaza’s transition and ensuring a two-state pathway.

This is a moment to consolidate this momentum. A Gaza Stabilization Fund, backed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab and Muslim partners, as well as European donors, would create a structured mechanism of the kind envisioned by the UN Security Council resolution that passed yesterday. Such a fund, possibly operated by the World Bank or another similar multilateral institution, could provide clear donor commitments, transparency, and oversight. It could also support the development of benchmarks for funding that are tied to governance, reconstruction achievements, and progress toward a two-state framework.

If today’s signals from Trump and MBS can catalyze donor alignment, the fund can be established quickly enough to actually support the immediate needs for Gaza’s ongoing humanitarian activities, and begin the process of funding for the ISF, reconstruction, and Gaza’s political transition.

For more on this meeting, and the context for Gaza - see the recent New Atlanticist publication by deputy director for Realign For Palestine,

How Trump can leverage the Saudi crown prince’s visit to help secure Gaza’s future

The goal of this force, as initially reported, will include enforcement, not simply peacekeeping – two very different missions that each require an aggressive mandate, which allows for the use of lethal force and is intended to disarm Hamas and demilitarize the Gaza Strip.

I have thought about this issue for a long time, and offer the following

10 key components of any mandate discussed at the United Nations Security Council:

1. The ISF should have the authorization for use of deadly force, including the ability to kill Hamas and apply lethal force against those with guns who refuse to disarm or pose a threat to the civilian population.

2. The ISF should have the ability to protect the new governance apparatus that needs to emerge in Gaza, as well as the entire transitional process, including the technocratic committee and other bodies.

3. The ISF must be given the means and technology to destroy tunnels and engage in a systematic clearance process of this deadly threat and vulnerability to long-term security.

4. The ISF should be responsible for clearing unexploded munitions, which are estimated in the thousands of tons, and pose a significant risk to civilian safety, and are a source of rearmament for Hamas.

5. The ISF should be the beginning of a gradual process of trust-building that leads to the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, including from the buffer zone, and critically, should lead to the establishment of organic, capable, and professional Palestinian security forces that are from Gaza, not from the West Bank.

6. The ISF should utilize private military contractors and integrated service providers, when and where appropriate, to conduct specialized missions targeting Hamas and address logistical and other operational issues.

7. The ISF should coordinate closely with the Israeli military and be able to declare areas under their control 100% clear of Hamas to prevent these areas from being targeted by the Israeli military.

8. The ISF should facilitate the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid and distribution throughout Gaza to prevent theft and criminality by Hamas, gangs, and looters. Furthermore, it should coordinate closely with humanitarian organizations to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers, facilities, supplies, and movements throughout the Gaza Strip.

9. The ISF should operate and protect Gaza’s border crossings with Israel and Egypt and ensure that no smuggling occurs above or below ground along Gaza’s borders with the two countries.

10. The ISF needs to coordinate with Israel to use and operate Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters for direct access, humanitarian missions, and to facilitate the entry of aid and supplies into the coastal enclave.

In addition to these tenets of the International Stabilization Force, there must be sustained and continued pressure on the creation of an international fund for Gaza to sponsor these activities.

It is my hope to see the world leaders come together, and for once, actually put forth something that will benefit the people of Gaza, and create a true pathway to a different reality for Gaza, Palestinians, Israelis, and the region.

A new Middle East axis may be emerging

Monday’s summit in Egypt marked a potential shift in US diplomatic strategy, moving away from partnerships with countries of the Abraham Accords and toward a new axis led by Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt. The absence of key Gulf leaders was notable, as was the lack of any reference to a two-state solution, which had previously been a central aspect of Arab engagement.

This deal, presented as a diplomatic breakthrough, may actually signal a US realignment toward working with Doha, Ankara, and Cairo as its primary partners in managing the stabilization and reconstruction of Gaza. Such a shift would represent a significant change in the US approach, moving away from the coalition that has worked with the United States and Israel toward integration, normalization, and broader reforms.

The geopolitical trade-offs of phase two

Phase two of the deal, in which the structure of a postwar Gaza is meant to take shape, will require significant pressure from outside powers on Israel and Hamas, and any complete deal will be built on complex geopolitical trade-offs.

Each key stakeholder involved appears to have extracted enough from the agreement to protect its core interests, while avoiding full accountability for the outcome.

US President Donald Trump and his team likely foresaw a pragmatic recalibration rather than a moral shift. It’s easy to see the appeal to the United States to outsource the management of stability to a secondary coalition of Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt, who would take the lead as custodians for Gaza’s reconstruction and internal stability, without the demand of a two-state solution or external funding.

For Qatar, this is an opportunity to continue its role as broker and to become the leading financier of redevelopment, leveraging its connections with Hamas. Qatar’s ongoing willingness to operate without a two-state solution or sidelining of Hamas allows it to maintain influence, particularly over its regional rivals.

Egypt’s motivations are primarily economic and security-based. This agreement is likely to enable the resumption of significant aid, an influx of foreign capital, and new development contracts, as well as Egypt’s enhanced security control in the Sinai Peninsula. This could provide substantial benefits for Egyptian firms and increase Egypt’s leverage in regional security affairs.

Meanwhile, Turkey stands to gain renewed regional relevance and economic opportunities. Ankara could benefit from reconstruction contracts, infrastructure partnerships, and increased trade, providing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with enhanced influence both domestically and internationally.

Israel’s calculations

For Israel, the deal preserves an illusion of control and victory. Despite the failures exposed by the events of October 7, Israeli political and military leaders seem to believe they can calibrate Hamas’s strength and manage it. Although several core tenets of Israel’s security doctrine—early warning, deterrence, and even decisive victory—failed over the past two years, there has yet to be any serious attempt to change the doctrine. Instead, most evidence suggests these tenets remain intact, while Israel doubles down on different tactics to pursue these goals, such as more human intelligence over just digital monitoring. As such, Israel seems to still believe it can keep Hamas weak enough to avoid direct threats but strong enough to prevent the total collapse of local governance and avoid an intra-Palestinian civil war.

There is a real possibility that Hamas operatives could be absorbed into a new “civil administration” under the guise of an Arab stabilization mission, which would serve as a containment strategy rather than a true transition of power.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have seen an opportunity to conclude the war with the return of hostages, achieving a perceived moral victory. At the same time, the continued existence of Hamas serves Israel’s right-wing strategic narrative, justifying ongoing security measures, economic blockades, and political consolidation. The notion of an Arab stabilization force could serve as a cover for reconstituting Hamas operatives as new civilian police force.

Washington’s approach to Hamas

Trump indicated on Monday that Hamas had been approved for a limited period to conduct internal security operations in Gaza, suggesting a shift in the US objective from removing Hamas to reframing it as a quasi-civilian authority capable of maintaining internal order for now.

This approach by Washington would carry significant risks. The primary blind spot is that Hamas is not a rational political actor seeking incremental power, but a hybrid militant-ideological movement driven by the logic of permanent resistance to the point of large-scale mass suicidal policy. Strategies based on financial leverage, limited autonomy, or managed coexistence are likely to replicate the structural failures observed in Gaza over the past decade—periodic conflict, cyclical reconstruction, and a lack of a path to legitimate governance, let alone a future for the people of Gaza or a Palestinian state.

The US green light to Hamas’s security operations likely reflects a belief among dealmakers that Qatar’s role in reconstruction, Egypt’s economic and security interests, and Turkey’s economic ambitions could be balanced in the interest of stabilizing the conflict.

The flawed assumptions of the deal

The failure to articulate a robust disarmament and deradicalization plan for Hamas may suggest a lack of expectation that such outcomes are achievable. But consider the dealmakers: We are looking at a new trio of core actors who are not the moderate Arab reformers of the Abraham Accords, but rather parties with fundamentally different ideologies and objectives.

In Washington, Republicans often focus on interest-based negotiations in foreign policy but can succumb to idealism. Democrats, meanwhile, often emphasize principles and ideals, but may overlook the realistic interests of the actors involved. Both perspectives still risk underestimating the ideological resolve of groups like Hamas, which have continuously masked their true intentions when needed to perpetuate their armed resistance struggle.

Ultimately, the risk lies in assuming that Hamas can be managed through financial incentives or limited autonomy. There is a real possibility that the deal guarantees outcomes favorable to Hamas, allowing it to reform into a new version of civilian power, absent any genuine disarmament or deradicalization measures.

What this deal has done is elevate Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt, while leaving Hamas with some semblance of power, representing a shift in the balance of power in the region. The dynamic leaves the people of Gaza at risk, once again, of being left behind.

Melanie Robbins is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Realign for Palestine project.

In an era when dialogue across the Israeli-Palestinian divide has become increasingly rare, a Palestinian technologist in Los Angeles is testing whether artificial intelligence (AI) can succeed where human facilitators have struggled.

Adnan Jaber has spent the past year developing what he calls a “dialogue facilitator”—an AI system designed to mediate conversations between opposing sides in political conflicts, extracting points of agreement and gently steering discussions away from familiar patterns of recrimination.

The technology could represent a new frontier in conflict mediation, one that operates below the level of formal diplomacy but above the chaos of social media discourse. The innovation targets the micro-level interactions that could eventually support broader political solutions—building the connective tissue that formal diplomacy presupposes but rarely supplies.

During my first encounter with Jaber’s technology, I was startled by its simplicity. Melanie Robbins (the deputy director of Realign For Palestine) and I listened as the AI bot—speaking with Jaber’s own voice—mediated a live conversation. “Good point Melanie,” the artificial voice said, before paraphrasing points, flagging areas of agreement, and steering the discussion forward in a way that felt remarkably human.

The technology appears able to mirror skilled facilitation; meanwhile, it is infinitely scalable. Therefore, it could represent a fundamental shift in how consensus-building occurs in deeply divided societies.

Jaber was born and raised in East Jerusalem to an Arab Muslim family, and he told me that in his twenty-two years living there, he never had a single Jewish friend. He said that barriers to dialogue with his Jewish neighbors seemed insurmountable—he didn’t speak Hebrew, they didn’t speak Arabic, and the divide followed him into his professional life. “I would show up for interviews in Tel Aviv, sit at the table across from someone wearing a kippah, and there was always this tension,” he recalled. “Neither side really trusted each other.”

He told me that a program called Tech2Peace changed everything for him. The initiative connects young Palestinians and Israelis through high-tech training and dialogue workshops, and Jaber explained to me that it provided his first real experience with structured conversation across the divide. During empathetic listening sessions where participants shared stories about identity and conflict, one aspect caught his attention above all others: the facilitators themselves. “They’d open hard topics, give people time to speak, summarize for everyone’s understanding, invite contrary opinions, raise or calm the tone depending on how the discussion was going,” he explained. “I really liked how facilitation was done.”

But Jaber added that he also saw constraints, because it’s not realistic to imagine a trained facilitator in every room or in every conversation where such mediation might help. So, he told me, he decided to build a voice that behaves like one and can be scaled infinitely.

The facilitator doesn’t arbitrate who’s right. Instead, it does something simpler and more functional: Every few exchanges, it produces what amounts to a receipt showing what both parties have agreed upon, then asks a follow-up question intended not to enrage, but to bring unavoidable questions to the fore. Though Jaber is characteristically humble about the technology’s limits—he acknowledged that “AI can move minds, but it doesn’t always move hearts”—there’s something unique about the technology’s ability to encourage a fragile consensus and steer a conversation away from polarization.

Jaber’s prototype is unglamorous—no gleaming app or slick interface. Two people speak, and the system listens, paraphrases plainly, flags overlaps, and nudges the conversation forward. It works on a simple phone line, a choice Jaber said he made to improve the tool’s accessibility. The people he wants to reach often do not have smartphones and only have access to inconsistent data (or none at all). In Gaza, Israeli strikes have destroyed telecommunications infrastructure—including fiber cables, transmission towers, and switching stations—and fuel shortages have knocked out backup generators, diving the territory into multiple near-total communication blackouts since October 2023. Palestinian operators report that roughly 70 percent of the network has been damaged or destroyed, leaving much of what remains operating on outdated 2G connectivity.

But accessibility is only half the challenge. Considering reports that Israel has used AI tools to generate targeting lists during the war, many Palestinians would view any technology that records their voices with deep suspicion—no matter who built it or why. The fear that transcripts or even participation data could be intercepted and weaponized isn’t theoretical; it’s rooted in the lived reality of surveillance in conflict zones.

Despite the issues, similar innovations elsewhere have shown promising results. Taiwan has deployed a vTaiwan platform for consulting with the public, which uses tools such as Pol.is for opinion mapping to help generate “rough consensus” on everything from Uber regulations to copyright law. The United Nations’ Innovation Cell has pioneered digital dialogues in conflict zones such as Libya and Yemen, bringing citizen voices into international negotiation circles.

While it may appear disheartening that machines are needed at all to mediate very human conversations, Jaber told me that sometimes humanity needs to accept help wherever it is found. His response captured something essential about the current moment in conflict mediation—the recognition that traditional approaches have reached their limits and that new tools might open possibilities that human facilitators, however skilled, often struggle to access.

For Jaber, these realities make it necessary to have auditable prompts, transparent summaries, and the publication of both agreements and dissent. Currently based in Los Angeles after wrapping up a teaching semester at the University of California, Los Angeles, he’s preparing to register a company for Jaber AI while grappling with the harder questions his work raises.

Yet, even the most sophisticated dialogue technology means little without uptake from decision makers. Taiwan’s vTaiwan succeeded partly because of visible government integration. For initiatives like Jaber AI to achieve lasting impact, they must feed real decisions rather than merely populate dashboards with interesting data.

Jaber hasn’t yet tested his facilitator with Palestinians and Israelis on the ground, having only had opportunities to probe it with diasporans thus far. When I suggested integrating the facilitator into something like Omegle—allowing random real-time conversations between Jewish and Palestinian participants—he chuckled at my enthusiasm but told me that he is interested in the possibility.

Perhaps that’s the most striking thing about Jaber’s approach: the combination of technical sophistication with his profound humility about what technology can and cannot accomplish. In building an AI that speaks with his voice, he’s created something that embodies both the promise and the limits of algorithmic mediation. It cannot solve the fundamental political questions that divide Israelis and Palestinians, but it might create spaces where those questions can be discussed without the conversation immediately dissolving into recrimination.

The war in Gaza is far from over, even if it is tactically stopped for now. The agreement thus far is specific to Phase One, which relates to the hostage-prisoner swap and a partial Israeli military withdrawal from the Strip. Afterwards, new negotiations must start to address the arguably more difficult issues: Hamas’s disarmament, the entry of an international force into Gaza, a transitional governance apparatus, and the process of neutralizing threats emanating from the Strip. Hamas is expected to stall, delay, and create challenges for the enclave’s future without the terror group.

During this period, Hamas is likely to stall, drag things out, and seek to prevent a future for the coastal enclave without the terror group. Hopefully, there won’t be a resumption of hostilities after this phase is finished. Still, rational thinking, awareness, and pragmatism require an understanding of all the challenges ahead.

Hamas's agreement to give up its chief bargaining chip, the Israeli hostages, for Phase One of the deal was the result of unprecedented pressure against the terror group by Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt. Each of whom had their own interests: the Turkish want sanctions relief, the F-35 stealth fighter, new F-16s, and greater cooperation with the US; the Qataris got the apology from Israel for the failed airstrike and the US commitment to Doha’s national security through a new agreement/pact, and in exchange, in exchange for delivering the hostages, which meant delivering Hamas; and Egypt which has been terrified of the specter of forced displacement of Gazans into Sinai, and had mobilized the Egyptian army on the country’s eastern border could ease the intense tensions with Israel and threatened the peace treaty between the two countries, not to mention US foreign aid.

Cumulatively, this meant that the three countries (Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt) applied enormous pressure on Hamas, which is otherwise isolated, militarily weakened, its allies defeated, and without options.

As the hostage and prisoner exchange process unfolds, one thing to watch for is whether Hamas holds parades or “Super Bowl”-style parties during the handover of living and deceased Israeli hostages. Although the group had previously stated they wouldn’t do this, as they said earlier this year, they still did it anyway. If the terror group does this again, that should tell you everything you need to know about their future intent. A militant entity that’s supposedly willing to disarm wouldn’t engage in such depraved behavior to prove that it’s still around.

Let’s hope that Hamas terrorists are not scrambling to iron and dry-clean their folded/hidden military uniforms that they wouldn’t use during the war, because they are only used during their horrific displays of such despicable behavior as we saw in each exchange. These were, in fact, the only times Hamas fighters wore military uniforms in the past two years, while otherwise hiding among civilians in plain clothes during actual combat.

What comes next?

Over the next several days, more information, details, and specifics will be revealed about the plan, its implementation, and, hopefully, the framework for Phase Two discussions. It is imperative that during this time, the people of Gaza not be left behind with an emboldened Hamas, forgotten about following phase 1. The only way to effectively avoid this from happening is for the fulfillment of the entirety of the 20 Point Plan, including the complete disarmament of Hamas. De-Hamasifying Gaza will be the final factor in determining whether this plan can succeed in bringing truly stable peace to the region.

Many former hostages were present today at the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC for a commemoration hosted by the Hostages and Missing Families Forum with support from US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and his wife, Allison. Several former hostages shared the horror they went through on October 7 and beyond, not to mention the unimaginable suffering experienced by their families while waiting for their release. These voices are worth remembering whenever people try to convince you that October 7 and hostage-taking were somehow an inevitability due to occupation or oppression. What occurred on that fateful day was not “resistance” by any stretch of the imagination. It was nothing but violent criminality that was entirely unnecessary and avoidable. It did not need to happen.

The combination of an international stabilization force, a comprehensive deradicalization plan, economic rejuvenation, regeneration, Arab and international involvement, humanitarian support, capacity building, and the departure from rhetoric that proposed removing the population is a cumulatively positive framework and blueprint for managing Gaza’s future transformation.

The biggest challenge is two-fold: will Hamas accept a ceasefire that removes its chief leverage, the hostages, all at once in the first few days, and will the terror group agree to disarm or leave Gaza? So far, Hamas has stated that it has not formally seen the plan, nor has it been able to view an official proposal. Netanyahu’s apology to Qatar today, likely at Trump’s request, was probably a preparation for bringing Hamas back into the loop.

The second issue is whether Netanyahu and his government will keep their word or break the ceasefire once the hostages are retrieved. Some look at what he did in March when he decided not to pursue phase II of the truce that was initiated by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, as a warning that he might be willing to do the same thing, only this time, he won’t have the pressure of the hostage families and a large number of Israelis protesting against him.

Then there is the question of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which the Arabs want to be involved in Gaza as a way to create that pathway toward Palestinian Statehood, something that Trump’s plan also envisions. Yet, there is a gap between Trump’s plan and Netanyahu’s rhetoric on the near future, and how he still does not expect the PA to be part of the transitional period in the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Authority and a pathway to statehood will calm Egypt and Jordan down, invite Gulf participation, enable Saudi-Israeli normalization, and open numerous pathways for Israel’s regional integration and peace between Arab and Muslim countries on one hand, and the Jewish state on the other (expanding the Abraham Accords). Trump’s promise that the annexation of the West Bank would not be formalized as a matter of Israeli policy may have been an attempt to ensure that this outcome is achieved.

Still, if the Palestinian Authority is perpetually blocked from participating in Gaza’s future, it is difficult to imagine ways in which Arab and international demands can be truly fulfilled, and how Gaza could ever be part of a cohesive Palestinian national entity. One thing is clear: this plan may very well end up being like a whole host of others preceding it, just a pile of promises with nothing substantive happening after all the media coverage and hopes for a resolution. If, however, this succeeds in ending the war, Gaza will be proven to be the critical key to unlocking regional stability, the expansion of peace, economic prosperity, US geopolitical interests, and Israel’s integration.

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What Is the Radical Pragmatist?

The Radical Pragmatist is a new initiative of Realign for Palestine—designed to inspire Palestinian advocates and their allies to shape a future of dignity and peace, with a reconstituted Gaza, a future Palestine, and a secure Israel.

As the political home for radically pragmatic thinking, R4P champions a pro-Palestine, pro-peace narrative that rejects extremism, embraces multiple truths, and pushes forward-looking solutions. This platform expands that vision and creates space for rigorous analysis, fresh frameworks, firsthand testimony, and practical roadmaps you can share with policymakers, thought leaders, media, and analysts.

Nearly two years into the devastating Israeli war in Gaza, following the October 7 massacre by Hamas, most conversations about Palestine, Israel, and Gaza have fallen into entrenched binary thinking and positions.

At Realign for Palestine, a third way is possible: a paradigm and movement rooted in critical thinking, empathy, and solutions. That’s why we’re launching our new Substack, The Radical Pragmatist.

Why Radical Pragmatism?

Radical pragmatism is one of Realign For Palestine’s founding values. It means:

• Rejecting absolutism and sloganeering

• Recognizing multiple truths and shared humanity

• Prioritizing outcomes that are achievable, dignified, and mutual.

Who You Will Hear From:

As part of a diversity of voices and perspectives, The Radical Pragmatist will spotlight Palestinian voices like:

• Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib – Founder of Realign for Palestine

• Jaser AbuMousa – Yale Peace Fellow, former Gaza-based program officer

• Hamza Howidy – Peace activist and human rights advocate

• Adnan Jaber – Founder of PeaceTech Affinity Group

• Mohamed Jamous – Humanitarian and community leader from Ramallah

• Individuals in Gaza and the West Bank.

The Radical Pragmatist will also include allies committed to coexistence and pragmatism, such as: Faisal Saeed Al Mutar, Mozah AlKindi, Rabyaah Althaibani, Sheikh Musa Drammeh, Zainab Khan, Melanie Robbins, and more. R4P will host live broadcasts featuring special guests and policymakers.

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The Radical Pragmatist is more than a newsletter—it’s a platform for those ready to move past slogans and toward tangible outcomes.

Subscribe and join us in reimagining the future of Palestine through dialogue, empathy, and pragmatic action.

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